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take and hold and the trust is capable of being executed and enforced
according to the law of the place to which the property was to be
transmitted under the will of the donor the disposition is perfectly
valid. This decision represents the majority view in this area in refusing to upset a charitable trust which does not offend the policy
of the state of domocile. Cavers, TRUSTS INTER VIVOS AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 44 HARv. L. REv. 161, 167 (1931).
The West Virginia court has never decided the precise question
raised by the principal case. It did however, approach the problem
in American Bible Soc'y v. Pendleton, 7 W.Va. 79 (1873). In that
case M, living in Virginia, made a deed conveying land in Pennsylvania to P to be sold, directing that the proceeds of the sale should
be held by P subject to the written order of the grantor. Subsequently
M made a will disposing of the proceeds of the land, which will
was admitted to probate in Virginia. The court held that the validity
of any bequest of the proceeds of the land must be determined by the
laws of Virginia in force when the will took effect. This decision
would seem to favor the orthodox rule enunciated earlier.
In conclusion then, we may say that the orthodox rule is undergoing some modification. Although it is only speculation, it is submitted that West Virginia would follow this change and adopt the rule
presented by the principal case.
George CharlesHughes, III
Conflict of Laws-Appointment of a
Valid Agent for Service of Process
Ds leased two incubators from P, a corporate lessor with its
principal place of business in New York City. The lease was a form
lease signed in Michigan designating the wife of one of the corporate
lessor's officers as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any
process within the State of New York. The form lease was less than
one and a half pages long and the clause designating the agent to accept the service of process was just above the signatures of Ds. The
above clause in no way stated that the designated agent was obligated, or had duty to give notice to Ds if service of process was
served. P later sued Ds in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York for an alleged default of the payments
of the lease. The agent, upon receipt of service of process from the
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United States marshal, on the same day sent the summons and complaint to Ds. The district court quashed service of process on the
ground that the lease did not create a valid agency for the service of
process. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Held, reversed. Five members of the Court expressed that the
designated agent was an agent authorized by appointment to receive
service of process within the meaning of Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 4(d) (1), because the agent gave prompt notice of the service
to Ds even if there was no obligation to do so. National Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 84 Sup. Ct. 354 (1964).
The question presented here is whether a party to a private contract may appoint an agent to receive service of process within
the meaning of Rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
where the agent has not expressly undertaken to transmit notice to the
party and the parties were not on equal footing as far as bargaining
power was concerned.
Rule 4(d) (1) states that service of process can be served upon
an individual by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process, however, the rule does not define what is a valid
"appointment of an agent." The majority in the principal case
treated the issue involved as a determination of a federal procedural
rule and therefore, state law did not have to be followed in determining if a valid agency existed. The Court held that there was a
valid agency apparently because the agent made a prompt acceptance
and transmittal to the defendants of the service of process although
she had not expressly undertaken to do so. By way of dicta the
Court stated that if the appointed agent had not given such prompt
notice then the agency would have been invalid.
Dissent in the principal case disagreed in that they thought this
was a problem dealing with substantive law and state law should
have been determinative, but even if this was a federal procedural
question the agency should be held invalid because it was a "sham"
agency. The minority also felt that the agency should be held
invalid because of lack of due process to the defendants.
On the question of whether the Supreme Court should follow
the law of New York in determining if the agency was valid, the
Court held in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) that
a federal court which exercised jurisdiction over the litigants on the
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ground of diversity of citizenship was not free to treat this question
as of so-called "general law," but must apply the state law as declared by the highest state court. In the principal case federal
jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The highest court of
New York which has passed on the question held in Rosenthal v.
United Transp. Co., 188 N.Y. Supp. 154 (App. Div. 1921) that
only residents of the state of New York could appoint an agent to
accept service of process in New York. In Francis v. Humprey, 25
F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1938) the court held that the act of June 19,
1934, which gave the United States Supreme Court its authority to
prescribe rules governing procedure in the federal district courts in
civil actions at law, provided that such rules shall neither abridge,
enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. If Rule
4(d) (1) was interpreted and applied in the principal case to
abridge or modify the substantive rights of the defendants or to
enlarge the substantive rights of the plaintiff as established by the
law of New York, it would seem the rule as thus interpreted should
be void and unauthorized. The majority in the principal case also
said that "if" the law of New York was applied they would rely upon
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Graphic Art Designers, 36 Misc.2d
442, 234 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1962) where the court held the
agency to be valid. The majority believed the Rosenthal case to be
entirely inapposite because it interpreted a civil practice act which
created a procedure whereby a resident of New York could appoint
an agent for the receipt of process by designation of a person to
receive service and the filing thereof with the county clerk. Thus
the Rosenthal case clearly applied only to residents of New York
who left the state and was not in point with the principal case.
In determining if the agency violated any due process rights of
the defendants, the dissent cited Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877) which held that no state can serve a personal process on a
resident of another state and compel him to leave his home state
and go to a foreign state where a personal judgment might be handed
down against him without the actual consent of the defendant to
waive his constitutional right. Waivers of constitutional rights to be
effective must be deliberately made and can be made only by clear
and unambigious language. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
The majority felt that defendants gave their consent to be sued in
another state by signing the lease which was only one and a half pages
long. Also the clause designated the appointed agent was just above
the signatures of the defendants. Dissent based their opinion on the
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idea that due process was invaded because the form lease was forced
upon the defendants by the superior bargaining power of the
plaintiffs and the defendants had no other choice but to sign the
lease.
Prior to the principal case there was authority that there must be
an actual appointment of an individual as an agent to receive service
of process. There must be an actual appointment of an agent and not
just an implied appointment. Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1086, 1088
(1952). The appointment of the agent may be accomplished by contract. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.12, at 931 (2d ed. 1962).
The court in Szabo v. Keeshin Motor Express, 10 F.R.D. 275 (1950)
held that appointment under Rule 4(d) (1) meant an actual appointment by the defendant, and if such appointment has been made,
service upon the agent gives the court jurisdiction. In Fleming v.
Malouf, 7 F.R.D. 56 (W.D.N.Y. 1947) the court stated that appointment under Rule 4(d) (1) of an agent to accept service of
process does not mean that the agent has to show any express
authority other than accepting service of process for his principal.
The majority decision adds to this prior law that there is a valid
agency where the agent accepts service and does in fact deliver notice
to the defendants of the service of process as soon as possible although the agent had not expressly undertaken to do so. However,
it would seem that the Court did not base their decision on the lease
agreement itself in determining if the agency was valid, but instead
used hindsight to see what were the results and effects of the contract after the contract was breached.
On the other hand, the dissent examined the contract as of the
time of its making and because the "appointed agent" was under
no obligation to transmit service of process to the defendants, felt that
the agency should be held invalid. In Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S.
13 (1928), the Court held that state statutes that appoint an agent
for service of process must make it a requirement that the appointed
agent give notice of the service of process. It was reasoned by the
dissent that if federal law was to apply in determining if a valid
agency existed in the principal case, instead of state law, then it was
reasonable to require that the appointed agent be obligated to give
notice just as state statutes have to require their appointed agents
to give notice. However, the majority of the Court in the principal
case did not believe that the decision in Wuchter v. Pizzutti, supra,
applied to the principal case because the parties themselves contracted
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for the agent to accept the service of process. Hence, the holding
clearly shows that there is a difference in a state appointing an agent
for service of process and the parties themselves appointing an agent
for service of process.
The decision in the principal case making the agency valid may
open the doors in the future to a great deal of litigation on this
matter. Other big businesses may start putting clauses in all of their
interstate contracts specifying a "sham" agent to accept service of
process for the other party. If the parties were on an equal footing as
far as bargaining power is concerned than it would seem that the
result of the principal case would be more easily accepted. But, as in
the principal case, where the bargaining power greatly favors the
plaintiff, there is some doubt that the defendant, by having the
form lease forced upon him, actually gave his consent to be sued
in a foreign state and waive his constitutional right to be sued in his
home state.
William Walter Smith

Criminal Law-Extradition for Nonsupport
Petitioner, a New Hampshire resident, instituted habeas corpus
proceedings to obtain release from custody. Massachusetts had
brought extradition proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act. A hearing in New Hampshire resulted
in a refusal of extradition. Thereafter, Massachusetts brought proceedings under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act against petitioner to answer criminal charges for the nonsupport of his alleged
illegitimate child born in Massachusetts in 1953 shortly after the
mother had moved there from New Hampshire. The mother married
sometime thereafter and continued to reside in Massachusetts. The
petitioner was never within the state of Massachusetts. In 1962
the mother requested public support and as a result Massachusetts
officials started extradition proceedings. Held, writ granted. Massachusetts could not impose on a New Hampshire resident never
present in Massachusetts an obligation to support an alleged illegitimate child nor make his failure to support criminal. Under the law
of New Hampshire, no duty to support an illegitimate child arises
unless a suit to determine paternity is instituted within one year after
the birth of the child. The dissent stated that section 6 of the Uniform
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